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All of us remember Manning Clark loved to draw grand, sweep-
ing rhetorical contrasts, in often slightly archaic but wonderfully 
intense language, between ‘life a#rmers’ and the ‘life deniers’, 
between ‘mourners’ and the ‘mockers’, between Henry Lawson’s 
‘old dead tree’ and ‘young green tree’, and—my favourite—between 
‘enlargers’ and ‘straiteners’. 
Given life’s complexity and variability, any classification of 
human instincts or behaviour in starkly bipolar terms runs the risk 
of sliding into parody. I can remember an Oxford philosophy tutor 
of mine long ago solemnly—and absolutely incontestably—declar-
ing that ‘there are two kinds of people in the world: those who wear 
nightcaps to bed and those who don’t’. Just as they say about there 
being two kinds of social scientists: those who divide things into 
two and those who don’t.
But I also can’t help thinking, as I look at the way in which policy-
makers and decision-makers address most of the public policy issues 
with which I have been concerned over my own professional life, that 
our oracular professor was on to something. There does seem to be 
a mindset that is basically open, embracing, inquisitive, adventur-
ous and positive, and another that is narrow, confined, cautious and 
negative. Most people do seem to line up, instinctively or intuitively, 
on one side of this line or the other. And when they are influential in 
policy-making, it really does matter which side they choose.
International relations theory does not have very much to say 
about ‘enlargers’ and ‘straiteners’ or perhaps—to practically minded 
sceptics—anything much else at all. But it does o!er at least one 
comparable distinction, the oldest and most familiar of all in the 
discipline, between Idealists and Realists. It’s not too di#cult to 
get a handle on what is involved here. It’s rather similar, after all, to 
the distinction I’ve always made between the two basic motivations 
that tug for attention in every politician I’ve ever known: idealism 
and megalomania. Everybody in the business believes in at least 
something they want to achieve while they are there, and all but the 
impossibly naive have some kind of tolerance for the sordid busi-
ness of acquiring and wielding the power needed to do so, but in 
terms of what really gives pollies their jollies, the proportions vary 
wildly from one to another.
But Idealism v. Realism is much too simple for the professionals 
these days. You can forget about tenure track unless you can confi-
dently draw out the distinctions between classical, post-classical, 
neo-, defensive and o!ensive realists; and on the other side bet-
ween idealists and liberals, and then between a miscellany of neo-, 
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institutional and other-hyphened subspecies of the latter. It’s no 
surprise to me that among those who seem to be most at home in 
this discipline are my fissiparous colleagues on the far Left, who (as 
well explained in that excellent documentary film The Life of Brian) 
have long absorbed themselves in cosmically significant ideological 
di!erences indistinguishable to the less sensitive.
Cutting across the Idealist–Realist axis is another one, which 
might look to those outside the academy rather indistinguishable 
but that I am patiently told is really quite di!erent—because it’s 
methodological more than ideological. This is the division between 
Constructivists at one end of the scale, who are primarily moved 
by the notion that norms and ideas really matter, and Rationalists, 
who are not so persuaded. And then of course, out in a corner of 
space of their own, are a miscellany of Post-Modernist and related 
world views of varying degrees of impenetrability, which my late 
and dear friend Tony Judt has sweepingly, but I suspect not entirely 
unfairly, described as ‘narcissistic obscurantism’.
All these, it will be appreciated, are just the mainstream labels: 
one wouldn’t want to know how many other eddies and pools, 
and whole inland seas, there are in international relations theory. 
When I asked a Melbourne University colleague the other day, in 
a genuine spirit of enquiry, which one of them fitted me best, I was 
consoled to be told that whatever other surface manifestations I 
may have displayed over the years of everything from institutional 
liberalism (in my idiosyncratic passion, for example, for trying to 
make the UN and regional architecture work better) to very hard-
nosed realism (in my negotiation of Timor Sea boundaries or peace 
deals with the Khmer Rouge), that did not make me, as I thought I 
might be, a candidate for ‘Analytical Eclecticism’—that new theo-
retical school recently identified as a home for the intellectually 
sluggish and disreputable who are too ill-disciplined and ignorant 
to fit in anywhere else.
On the contrary, I was informed, given my other idiosyncratic 
passion for spending vast amounts of time participating in com-
missions and panels trying to change international behaviour by 
starting with the way in which policy-makers think about tough 
issues—for example, how to react to genocide and mass-atrocity 
crimes (that ‘responsibility to protect’ principle that seems at last 
to have some real traction in the response to contemporary horrors 
in Kenya and Libya)—I was clearly, deep down inside, a Construc-
tivist. I was rather chu!ed by this, feeling rather like Molière’s 
bourgeois gentleman on whom, it will be recalled, was bestowed 
when he woke up one morning the thrilling revelation that for the 
last forty years of his life he had been speaking prose.
The trouble is that none of these labels, in my experience, seems 
to get close to describing the way in which those in this business 
behave. Even the most adventurous of us, most passionately com-
mitted to human rights and universal values and norms, know 
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that in the real world that crowds in upon us good ideas and values 
sometimes carry the day but often they don’t; realities constantly 
intrude, and compromises constantly have to be made. It is certainly 
discomfiting in the extreme to sit across the table from génocid-
aires, as I did in the Cambodian negotiations, generating howls of 
indignation from the Pilgers of this world as a result. But engaging 
with those for some or all of whose behaviour you feel the utmost 
distaste is not the same as endorsing that behaviour. Without 
being able to draw that distinction, diplomacy, and with it any kind 
of capacity to maintain stability in international relations and find 
solutions to problems and conflicts, would grind to a halt.
But the fact that compromises of this kind have to be made does 
not mean that there are no choices to be made. On the contrary, 
they arise everywhere, both in reacting to events and opportunities 
and in trying to set new agendas: the United States didn’t have to 
go to war in Iraq, and Australia didn’t have to join it; we don’t have 
to give aid to Africa, or run for the Security Council, or participate 
in any peacekeeping operations; we didn’t have to try to change the 
architecture of economic and security policy-making in the Asia–
Pacific; we didn’t have to try to lead the way in making peace in 
Cambodia; we don’t have to accept any particular number of refu-
gees; we don’t have to try to influence the global debate on climate 
change or nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
One of the most interesting treatments I have seen of the way 
theory relates to practice in the real world of international policy- 
making was an article in International Security a few years ago 
entitled ‘The Future of US–China Relations: Is Conflict Inevita-
ble?’ by the Princeton academic Aaron Friedberg, who did a stint 
in Vice-President Cheney’s planning o#ce during the Bush admin-
istration. Taking as his starting point the three main camps in 
contemporary international relations theorising—Realism, Lib-
eralism and Constructivism—he argues that what really matters 
most in determining their adherents’ attitudes and prescriptions 
on the China–US issue is a more fundamental, cross-cutting, divi-
sion between Optimists and Pessimists.
So optimistic Liberals believe in the utility, and possibilities, cre-
ated by interdependence, institutions and pressure for democrati-
sation; optimistic Realists believe that China’s power will remain 
relatively limited and its aims constrained, and play down the se-
curity dilemma its actions create for other players; and optimistic 
Constructivists believe that China’s engagement in international 
institutions of various kinds will lead to shifts in its strategic culture 
and in the norms of international behaviour accepted by its leaders. 
On the other hand, pessimistic Liberals see the Chinese leadership 
as struggling with political change, and prone to hyper-nationalist 
assertiveness, and too much internally driven US democratisation 
and human rights pressure as potentially counter-productive; pes-
simistic Realists see China’s power as growing, its aims expanding, 
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the security dilemma this poses as intense, and the need as a re-
sult for maintaining a firm competitive posture very strong; and 
pessimistic Constructivists worry that an excessively competitive 
approach by the United States will result in a hardening of Chinese 
leadership mindsets.
For optimists of all other theoretical stripes and colours, what 
matters, above all else, is believing in and nurturing the instinct of 
cooperation in the hope and expectation that decent human values 
will ultimately prevail; pessimists, on the other hand, see conflict of 
one kind or another as more or less inevitable, and either embrace 
enthusiastically or accept with resignation a highly wary and com-
petitive approach to the conduct of international relations. And 
that is probably as about as close as one gets, in the literature, to 
Manning Clark’s enlargers and straiteners. 
In translating this into an Australian foreign policy-making 
context, it would not be a stretch—and should not be taken as 
crude partisanship—to describe over the broad course of history, 
at least since we have had something resembling an indepen-
dent foreign policy, the approach taken by ALP governments as 
essentially optimistic and that of the Coalition as essentially pes-
simistic. But not all Labor governments—or Labor governments in 
waiting—can be described as enlargers, and by no means all Tories 
have been straiteners. 
Australian foreign policy—if we think of this as a desire to pursue 
our external interests accompanied by some independent capacity 
to do so—dates only from the Second World War. It was not until 
1940 that our first diplomatic posts, beyond the High Commission 
in Britain, were established. From 1901 until then, Australian lead-
ers, Labor and non-Labor alike, did show from time to time that they 
were interested in the world outside Australia, especially on issues 
such as race and immigration, regional security and relations with 
the United States and Japan. But apart from Billy Hughes’ table-
thumping at Versailles on German New Guinea (at the same time 
as he was fiercely resisting Japan’s proposal to have a racial equality 
clause in the new League of Nations Covenant), it was not until late 
1941, when Curtin made his celebrated appeal to the United States, 
that Australia showed itself capable of addressing a fundamental 
issue about its place in the world other than reflexively, instinct-
ively and dependently as a member of the British Empire.2
The creation of an Australian foreign policy really came only 
with Evatt, whose most striking contribution was his internation-
alism—his very real commitment to the building of cooperative 
multilateral institutions and processes to address both security 
and development objectives. His contribution to the founding of 
the United Nations is the stu! of which legends are made, and 
rightly so—especially in his fight for the rights of the smaller pow-
ers against the great powers in the respective roles of the General 
Assembly and the Security Council, and in his faith in the UN as an 
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agent for social and economic reform and as a protector of human 
rights. No previous Australian leader had anything like Evatt’s pas-
sion for cooperative internationalism, nor anything like his success 
in creating practical foundations for it. 
But there were aspects of Evatt’s world view, shared by the 
Labor Party of the time, which were not remotely enlarging. Right 
up until the Whitlam era, White Australia and the prejudices that 
nourished it, and the perception of the world (and particularly our 
own region) as a dangerous place from which Australia needed to 
be protected, were very strong strands in the party’s thinking. The 
early support from Evatt and Chifley for Indonesia’s independence 
struggle against the Dutch was perhaps the closest we came to 
understanding the new forces at work in our region, and our need 
to reposition ourselves accordingly. This didn’t become, however, 
a sustaining or dominant theme in our foreign policy at the time, 
and it certainly did not become one in the conservative era that fol-
lowed, from 1949 to 1972. 
There wasn’t much left of Evatt’s cooperative internationalism 
by the end of Menzies’ and his successors’ long reign. It is true that 
with the Cold War rendering the UN more and more impotent, 
and multilateral processes generally more and more sterile, there 
wasn’t much to pursue—other than a regional extension of alliance 
relationships. And true it is that we developed, particularly under 
Richard Casey, cordial diplomatic relations with the emerging new 
nations of the region; that Percy Spender’s Colombo Plan made a 
very useful contribution to our long-term relations with Asia; that 
John McEwen deserves credit for the 1957 treaty with Japan and 
the optimism and foresight that went with it; and that men such as 
Paul Hasluck, and particularly John Gorton and Harold Holt, had a 
quite open-minded international outlook.
But against all this there has to be weighed Menzies’ excruci-
ating Anglophilia, the maintenance until the late 1960s of the full 
vigour of the White Australia policy, the stridency of our support 
for Verwoerd’s South Africa, the intensity of our antagonism 
towards Communist China, the totality of our dependence upon 
the United States, and the ultimate comprehensive misjudgement 
of our intervention in Vietnam. All this combined to reinforce the 
image, and the reality, of an Australia largely isolated and irrelevant 
in its own region, deeply unsure of its identity, utterly pessimistic 
about its ability to be a force for change in its own right, and in any 
event wholly unclear about what kind of change it would want to 
pursue if it could. 
The Whitlam government well and truly broke this mould, 
undaunted by Cold War constraints and showing a great capacity, 
as Evatt had done, to match Australian foreign policy to the mood 
and needs of the time. Recognising China, bringing home our last 
troops from Vietnam, finally burying the White Australia policy, 
taking France to the World Court for its nuclear tests in the Pacific, 
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and accelerating Papua New Guinea’s independence were just 
some of the decisions in that tumultuously active 1972–75 period 
that set Australia on a new path. There was a confidently optimis-
tic internationalism about it all, combining a strong commitment 
to process (especially international treaties and international law, 
Gough’s obsession with which is the stu! of legend) with a particu-
lar sensibility to the then relatively new agenda of decolonisation 
and North–South dialogue.
The brief tenure of the Whitlam government meant that it did 
more initiating than consolidating (although I suspect that some-
what Rudd-like disposition might have continued even had it stayed 
in o#ce ten years). While the Fraser government, which followed 
from 1975 to 1983, was more than happy to re-embrace Cold War 
verities, and all the East–West division of friends and enemies that 
went with it, it is to the considerable credit of Malcolm Fraser that 
on the issues that mattered most for Australia’s long-term capacity 
to advance its interests, especially in the region, Whitlam’s policies 
were not only continued but reinforced. In particular Fraser and 
his foreign minister, Andrew Peacock, both understood as many in 
the Coalition for a long time did not—and perhaps in some cases 
still do not—the critical importance of abandoning government-
legitimised racism in any form whatsoever, at home and abroad, 
not least in their embrace of Vietnamese refugees, in fact less reluc-
tantly than Whitlam. This undoubtedly helped foster closer links 
in our region and saved Australia from becoming the international 
pariah it would have been had opposition to apartheid and mani-
fest discomfort with decolonisation persisted.
The Hawke and Keating governments that took us through 
the next thirteen years renewed that spirit of activist, optimistic 
adventure which had so characterised the Whitlam period, but—at 
least as I remember it!—in a rather more focused and systematic 
fashion. I was fortunate enough, as foreign minister for more than 
half that period, to have been left some major legacies by my prede-
cessor Bill Hayden: in particular his success in redefining our rela-
tionship with the United States (albeit in what might be described 
sometimes as creative tension with the PM); developing a real role 
for Australia in the international peace and disarmament move-
ment; and having us accepted as a responsible and knowledgeable 
voice on Indochina, which helped me enormously when I took on 
the Cambodia challenge early in my own tenure.
Within the niche role that is inevitably assigned to middle and 
lesser powers, we were able to achieve a great deal during those 
Labor years, including helping create the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation forum (APEC) and other new cooperative, regional 
economic and security architecture, all within a frame of refer-
ence, which Kevin Rudd later made his own, of an ‘Asia–Pacific 
community’ (in the Chinese literal-translation sense of ‘big 
family’ rather than the capital ‘C’ European sense of economic 
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integration); securing the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention and advancing some major nuclear weapons objec-
tives; playing a central role during the Uruguay Round trade 
negotiations; building, with France, a strong coalition to save the 
Antarctic environment from mining and oil drilling; and in being 
a key player in crafting the financial sanctions strategy that finally 
brought down apartheid in South Africa. We also played a very vis-
ible role in reshaping ideas, although not with anything like the 
success in implementing them I would have liked, about how the 
UN should be reformed to more e!ectively carry out its role in the 
post–Cold War environment.
Throughout our term we embraced wholeheartedly the opti-
mism and new cooperative spirit that was abroad with the end of 
the Cold War. And we had a sustaining model of what kind of coun-
try we wanted to be, and be seen to be: essentially an enlarger on 
the international scene, a middle power with a strong Asia–Pacific 
orientation, pursuing confidently and actively—at global, regional 
and bilateral levels as appropriate—clearly defined geopolitical 
interests, economic interests and what can and should be described 
as good international citizenship interests.
In many ways one of the innovations of which I was most proud 
as foreign minister was just this concept of ‘good international 
citizenship’, which I spelt out in a speech in December 1988, just a 
few months after I was appointed, and which remained for me very 
much a sustaining motif. The basic idea is very simple. Instead of 
thinking of national interests in just the two traditional bundles 
of geopolitical and strategic interests, and economic and trade 
interests, think of the commitment that the country can make to 
the achievement of other goods and values as amounting to a rel-
evant and vibrant third category: a country’s national interest in 
being, and being seen to be, a good international citizen. 
At the heart of the concept is the notion that every country has 
a major interest in seeing the achievement of global public goods, 
or—putting it less technically—the resolution of what Kofi Annan 
used to describe as transnational ‘problems without passports’, 
which are by their nature beyond the capacity of any one country, 
however great and powerful, to deliver or resolve. They include a 
clean and safe global environment; a world free of health pandem-
ics, out-of-control cross-border population flows, international 
tra#cking of drugs and people, and extreme poverty; a world with-
out cross-border terrorism; and a world on its way to abolishing all 
weapons of mass destruction. 
In a sense these various goods are what international relations 
professor Hedley Bull used to call ‘purposes beyond ourselves’. 
But there’s more to all this than disinterested altruism. It’s the 
harnessing of values and principles to very practical, and indeed 
self-interested ends, bringing together—if one wants to put it that 
way—the perspectives of enlargers and straiteners.
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The argument is that, by being seriously committed to these 
objectives, national self-interest is advanced in two ways. First, 
through reciprocity: my help for you today in solving your drugs 
and terrorism problem might reasonably lead you to be willing to 
help solve my environmental problem tomorrow. Second, through 
reputational benefit: the perception of being a country willing to 
take principled stands for other than immediately self-interested 
reasons does no harm at all to one’s own commercial and wider 
political agendas—as the Scandinavians in particular seem to have 
long well understood.
One of the Howard government’s first products, in 1997, was—
disappointingly but perhaps not surprisingly—a foreign policy 
white paper, In the National Interest, which reverted to the tradi-
tional duo of security and economic interests, completely aban-
doned the concept of good international citizenship as a third cat-
egory of national interests and by way of compensation restored 
to centre stage, as a third guiding light, ‘national values’. Not uni-
versal values, but national ones, explicitly described as reflecting 
our ‘predominantly European intellectual and cultural heritage’—
although, to be fair, when listed they did go a little beyond the rule 
of law and ‘commitment to a “fair go”’ to include racial equality and 
building support for human rights institutions.
Foreign policy was dominated throughout Howard’s long term, 
to 2007, by the prime minister himself—not by my long-serving 
successor, Alexander Downer, who I always suspected was instinct- 
ively an enlarger rather than a straitener: someone who, given 
his head, would have been just as comfortable in maintaining 
basic continuity with the Hawke–Keating agenda, particularly in 
the Asia–Pacific and the UN, as Fraser was in continuing Whitlam’s, 
but soon had that squashed out of him. Howard was and remains the 
quintessential pessimistic Realist: too focused on hard rather than 
soft power, deeply comfortable in following the US alliance lead 
wherever it took us, unadventurous in seeking global or regional 
policy change, profoundly uninterested in the UN and the whole 
idea of transnational problem-solving by creative multilateral 
cooperation, generally inward-looking and, until the wheel turned 
back a little in the last part of his term, manifestly uncomfortable 
with the whole idea of our primary relationships having to be in our 
own region, with geography trumping history.
Since the Labor government was returned in 2007 the wheel has 
turned again. Kevin Rudd as prime minister, though he knew every- 
thing about everything, was manifestly most comfortable, and 
successful, with foreign policy, and did unquestionably—with such 
help from his colleagues as they were allowed to muster—achieve 
the return of confident optimism to centre stage in the conduct of 
our international relations. That was most evident in his work on 
climate change (for all the domestic horror that issue generated for 
him), in building the role of the G20 in global economic management 
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and potentially on a wider front, in creating (albeit after a few dip-
lomatic slips along the way) important new regional architecture 
in the expanded East Asian Summit, in trying to win back a seat at 
the table for Australia in the UN Security Council, and in trying to 
give serious content and energy to a new global debate on nuclear 
disarmament. Julia Gillard has, understandably enough after a pro-
fessional lifetime absorbed in domestic issues, taken a little time to 
find her feet internationally—and perhaps to discover her inner en-
larger. But there still seems enough of that spirit to go round with the 
role that Kevin Rudd is still so actively playing as foreign minister.
If Labor has reverted to traditional type, so too has the Opposi-
tion, which has not shown any sign under Tony Abbott of anything 
other than being very straitened indeed, with dog-whistling about 
race, religion and refugees not totally absent from its collective 
repertoire. But there are clearly now, as there always have been, 
senior Coalition figures with a much more open and genuinely 
internationalist cast of mind; just as there are, as there always have 
been, those on the Labor side who, no doubt for the best electoral 
reasons, are rather less ready than most of their colleagues to 
embrace optimistically the region and the world, and more ready to 
pander to populist sentiment.
I will resist the temptation to plunge any further into the reeds 
and weeds of current policy debates. This may be found disappoint-
ingly and uncharacteristically timid, but it is because I do have a 
view that—however a"icted by relevance deprivation syndrome—
those long departed from the partisan fray should not try to restore 
their youth by rejoining it.
I am tempted, however, to make one last bipartisan plea to gov-
ernment and opposition colleagues: please think hard about restor-
ing, as a central guiding theme in the conduct of our international 
relations, the concept of good international citizenship, not just as 
an optional add-on for the soft-headed and charitably inclined, but 
as the third key pillar of our national interests. It is not a matter of 
left or right ideology, but simply of recognising that, in this interde-
pendent world of ours, with the multiple stresses that confront it, 
if civilisation as we know it is going to survive and thrive, then we 
have to recognise that we are all in this together.
Manning Clark, as he did in so many other ways, instinctively got 
this right. Asked to comment in 1971 on the impact on Australia of 
Britain joining the Common Market, he said on the ABC, in a talk 
quoted by Mark McKenna in his forthcoming biography of Clark: 
‘We have a chance to grow up, and stop being boastful about things 
Australian with a snarl on our lips for the rest of the world. We have 
a chance to become citizens of the world.’ He recognised clearly, 
as we should now, that the future not only of this country, but this 
planet, lies not with the pessimists but the optimists, not with the 
life deniers but the life a#rmers, and not with the straiteners but 
the enlargers.
